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Abstract. In this paper we describe the structure and functionality of a certifica-
tion integrated framework aimed to support the certification of security properties
of a Cloud infrastructure (IaaS), a platform (PaaS), or the software layer (SaaS).
Such framework will bring service users, service providers and cloud suppliers
to work together with certification authorities in order to ensure security proper-
ties and certificates validity in the continuously evolving cloud environment. For
this purpose, the framework relies on multiple types of evidence gathering with
respect to security, e.g., testing services, monitoring agents or trusted computing
proofs. In this paper we will focus only on the monitoring case and will illustrate
its use. Yet, this framework is designed to be able to follow models for hybrid,
incremental and multi-layer security certification since cloud security has to build
upon the entire cloud stack.
1 Introduction
The very nature of Cloud computing makes the systems deployed in such environment
more exposed than ever before. The surface of attacks targeting applications and data
has expanded from Web into mobile and cloud systems. As a consequence, the rapid
adoption of detection and protection mechanisms for companies’ assets along with the
assurance of the resources they consume or provide in Cloud has turned out in one of
highest priorities for companies using cloud support. Yet, this situation has also made
other companies reluctant of migrating their systems to cloud due to the feel of losing
control of their systems and becoming exposed.
But, not only the increased level of exposure but also the complexity in understand-
ing the underlying infrastructure, platform or services delivering the required function-
ality to the consumers have made different organizations to classify cloud security prop-
erties or risks to both guide cloud vendors in their road to meet security, and to assist
prospective cloud customers in assessing the overall security risk of a cloud provider.
These taxonomies usually reference the security requirements of the global ISO/IEC
27001. For instance, the Cloud Control Matrix [1] that is designed to provide fundamen-
tal security principles to guide cloud vendors and to assist prospective cloud customers
in assessing the overall security risk of a cloud provider.
However, how companies or individual customers get assurance that an IT product
meets its security objectives is a further question. According to Common Criteria [2],
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assurance can be derived from reference to sources such as unsubstantiated assertions,
prior relevant experience, specific experience, or active investigation. The framework
described in this paper supports the philosophy of providing (continuous) independent
assurance by active investigation. Namely, it offers support for a (constant) evaluation
of an IT resource in order to determine whether certain security property hold from
a given point in time on, in a particular context. The security certification scheme is
so conceived to create transparency in the industry, helping business to evaluate the
security risks they may accept when working with a particular cloud service provider.
Organization. We start by briefly summarizing off-the-shelf monitoring tools in sec-
tion 2. In section 3 we explain the infrastructure and functionality of a certification
framework for Cloud security. In section 4 we explain a monitoring based certification
process. We illustrate this process in section 5 using an example from the e-Health do-
main. Taking into account the state of the art of monitoring tools, we outline future
work in section 6. Finally, we draw conclusions in section 7.
2 State of the art of cloud monitoring tools
To the best of our knowledge, there is no other certification infrastructure similar to
the framework that we describe in section 3, i.e., there is no other framework able to
manage monitoring based certification, testing based certification and, in an immediate
future, also TPM based and hybrid certification (to combine both monitoring and testing
approaches).
Regarding cloud infrastructure monitoring, there are a number of open source ver-
sions of industrial strength cloud monitoring tools that could be used by the CUMU-
LUS framework as external evidence collectors (once that we have also certified their
reliability). First of all, we note that most of these off-the-shelf tools are dealing with
performance, availability, or resource consumption. This fact leaves most of the secu-
rity properties listed in [3] as not addressed by state of the art tools. Later, in section 6
we report on security properties coverage (w.r.t. the list in [3]) that seems to be reached
with the tools described here. This report is based on a preliminary suitability desktop
analysis of these tools to monitor evidences related to the security properties.
Zenoss Core [8] is an enterprise network and systems management application written
in Python that can monitor availability, performance, events and configuration across
layers and platforms. It has an open source version, Zen Pack, that makes possible
to monitor the capacity and performance of applications running on a Cloud Foundry
platform. This pack allows monitoring metrics like memory or disk consumption or
utilization, CPU average usage across instances, total and running application instances,
etc..
Nagios Core [9] is an open source system and network monitoring application origi-
nally designed to run under Linux. It watches hosts (processor load, disk usage, . . . ),
applications, services, OS, network protocols and is able to provide notifications. Na-
gios allows defining macros that can be instantiated as monitoring metrics for particular
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services. E.g., a time-stamp in time format indicating the time at which the service was
last detected as being in an ‘OK’ state. Moreover, it provides a powerful API allow-
ing easy monitoring of custom applications, services, and systems since it has a simple
plugin design that allows users to easily develop their own service checks.
Hyperic [14] provides proactive performance management with constant visibility into
applications and infrastructure, and a notification service. The key monitoring and man-
agement capabilities of Hyperic are resource discovery, metric collection, and event
tracking. Regarding resource discovery, the Hyperic agent managing a platform au-
tomatically discovers the resources, e.g., architecture, RAM, CPU speed, IP address,
domain name, etc., and software on the platform, e.g., web servers, application servers,
database servers, etc.. Regarding metric collection, the Hyperic agent can collect met-
rics for the resource targeting availability, performance, utilization, and throughput for
each supported resource type. Regarding event tracking, Hyperic can monitor log and
configuration files and record events of interest for most server types. E.g., user logins,
windows registry key changes, error logs, etc..
New Relic [12] delivers software as a service which monitors web and mobile appli-
cations in real-time that run in cloud, on-premise, or hybrid environments. The New
Relic Platform allows user to write plugin agents using Java or Ruby that can be run
anywhere to collect metrics from any available system and report them to New Relic
for customized dashboard visualization. A distinctive feature of New relic is that it pro-
vides metrics from end-user monitoring, e.g. apdex score; application monitoring, e.g.,
reponse times, performance of external services, most time consuming transactions;
database monitoring, e.g., time spent in database calls; infrastructure monitoring, e.g.,
server resources monitoring, analysis of CPU, disk, memory, etc.; availability and er-
ror monitoring, e.g., application availability monitoring and alerting, incident or error
detection, alerting and analysis.
Ganglia [10] is a scalable distributed monitoring system for high-performance com-
puting systems such as clusters and grids. Ganglia is an open-source project, that al-
lows monitoring the following metrics: system load averages that indicate the average
number of processes running on the systems; memory usage averages that indicate the
average usage of memory, in the form of user process or shared memory areas, system
cache, buffer or swap areas; % CPU utilization across all processes on all systems; and
network bandwidth usage averages that indicates the average use of network bandwidth
across the nodes.
Less oriented towards performance or availability monitoring, OSSEC [13] is an
Open Source Host-based Intrusion Detection System that performs log analysis, file
integrity checking, policy monitoring, rootkit detection, real-time alerting and active
response. It has a centralized manager that receives information from agents which
may be running simultaneously for different operating systems, e.g., Linux, MacOS,
Solaris, HP-UX, AIX and Windows.
In contrast with the monitoring tools that we have described before, the EVEREST
monitoring framework [7] that is the one that we are currently employing to monitor
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evidences in the CUMULUS project, supports a formal approach for the specification
and constant checking of a wide range of monitoring rules with precise time constraints,
and can deal with events that may be captured and notified from distributed sources and
through different communication channels. EVEREST can also support the monitoring
of conditions at various levels (e.g. network and application levels).
3 Infrastructure of a Cloud Security Certification framework
The certification infrastructure presented here is the core layer of the CUMULUS
framework [4] since it is responsible for issuing, maintaining, or revoking certificates
according to the different types of certification models that it can be provided with, e.g.
testing-based, monitoring-based certification models or, as a refinement, trusted com-
puting monitoring-based certification models. More details about the use of these types
of models in the framework can be found in [3,5,4]. The framework components that
are described next are in charge of managing the evidence gathered to assure a certain
resource’s security property, and accordingly the certificates that are issued, maintain
or revoked based on the collected proofs. The security properties that we aim to address
with the framework are those contained in the security property vocabulary specified in
CUMULUS deliverable D2.1 [3, Annex A]. Each subsection of this Annex A represents
one of the control domains of the Cloud Control Matrix [1].1
3.1 Components
Next, we describe the components of the certification framework that are depicted in
Figure 1.
– Certification Manager. This component communicates with a CA through a
Management API so as the CA can upload or delete new certification models. It
is also connected with the Certification and Security Models databases and it del-
egates the management to the testing or monitoring manager according to the type
of model the CA selects through a corresponding API. Moreover, it provides infor-
mation stored in Certification Models to the ‘Certification Generator/Attestation’
component through the ‘Generation API’.
– Certificate Generator / Attestation. This component issues certificates
when enough and appropriate evidences are collected, according to the informa-
tion of the Certification Models and based on the evidences stored in the ‘Evidence
Database (DB)’. It also stores the issued Certificates into the ‘Certificates DB’.
– Certification Communicator. This component provides the ‘Retrieval API’
that allows the actors to retrieve certificates. This component also provides a ‘No-
tification API’ to notify actors about the status of certificates. Moreover, from the
‘Certificates Registry DB,’ the certification communicator collects all information
about the requested certificates.
1 The list of security properties contained by deliverable D2.1 [3, Annex A] was specified by the
Cloud Security Alliance that is part of the CUMULUS project consortium
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Fig. 1. Cumulus framework architecture
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– Certificates DB. This is the database that stores the certificates: it acts as a
blackboard architecture for the ‘Certification Communicator’ and the ‘Certificate
Generator/ Attestation’ components. This repository is connected and properly re-
lated to the ‘Certified Services DB.’
– Evidence DB. This database stores the aggregated evidence collected that sustain
that a given security property holds for a resource. It plays the role of a blackboard
architecture for the four types of Managers and the ‘Certificate Generator/ Attesta-
tion’ components.
– Security Models DB. This database stores the the security models defined by
security experts.
– Certification Models DB. This database stores the certification models defined
by security experts.
– Monitoring Manager. This component is responsible for planning and setting up
the monitoring infrastructure when the ‘Certification Manager’ calls it through the
‘Monitoring Manager API’ according to a request from a Certification Model.
– Testing Manager. This module is responsible for planning and setting up the test-
ing infrastructure when the Certification Manager calls it through the ‘Testing Man-
ager API’, according to a request from a Certification Model.
3.2 Interactions and Usage
The information exchange with the certification infrastructure is mainly performed
through the Retrieval API, and the Management API that are described next.
– Management API. This is a provided interface that enables to carry out framework
management tasks, like adding and updating certification models in the ‘Certifica-
tion models DB’, as well as requesting to issue a certificate for a specific service.
– Retrieval API. This is a provided interface that enables the communication with
the framework: sending requests for certified components, checking the validity of
certificates and getting runtime-related information.
There are other APIs, i.e., Notification API, and Auditing API that are not yet imple-
mented but planned for future development. The Notification API will be an inter-
face that deals with subscriptions and notifications for receiving certificates that fulfill
the specified requirements at runtime. The Audit API will be an interface that allows
cloud auditors to review the certification process supported by the framework.
In Figure 2 we illustrate at a high level how the process of certificate creation is
supported by the interaction of the framework components, and driven through the
Management API. Note that a CA directly interacts with a dashboard that is not part
of the framework but allows user friendly interaction with it. The certificate creation
process starts when a CA selects a resource (namely, a target of certification-TOC), e.g.
a service, and a security property to be certified for this cloud resource, e.g. it stores
data encrypted. For this combination, the CA also has to select a certification model
(from those retrieved from the certification models database). Once these parameters
have been instantiated, a certificate is requested to the certification manager that passes
this request into the testing or the monitoring manager (depending on the certification
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model that was selected). Either of these managers uses external but trusted cloud test-
ing or monitoring modules to gather and store evidences that can sustain the security
property chosen for the selected resource. When these evidences are sufficient, a cer-
tificate is generated by the Certification Generator component that, in addition, stores
the new certificate that it has generated based on the evidences. In the following sec-
tions, we will provide more details of the certification process, placing the focus on the
monitoring case.
Fig. 2. Certificate creation process
We describe next the stakeholders that were identified for the CUMULUS frame-
work [4]. Ultimately, all of them have to interact with the infrastructure explained in
this section. Cloud Service Consumers use the framework either to develop an applica-
tion fulfilling some security requirements, to retrieve a certified service, or to check the
validity of a certificate; Certification Authorities (CA) use the framework either to issue
a certificate for cloud services, or to define or validate a certification model (that can be
used afterwards to certify various services); Cloud Service Providers use the framework
either to specify a service to be certified, to issue a certificate for a service, or to de-
fine or check the validity of a certification model; Cloud Auditors use the framework to
check the security compliance of a given application based on the documentation pro-
vided by the framework; and Security Experts that use the framework to define security
properties and related certification requirements for a certain domain.
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4 Monitoring based certificate creation process
The certification management process in the case of monitoring based certificates is
handled by the monitoring manager. The whole process is driven by the monitoring
based certification model (MBCM) that is passed to the manager. This model is defined
in XML according to the schema shown in Figure 3. A MBCM specifies:
Fig. 3.MBCM Overall schema
1. the cloud service to be certified (i.e., a Target of Certification (ToC));
2. the security property to be certified for ToC;
3. the certification authority who will sign the certificates generated by the model;
4. an assessment scheme defining general conditions regarding the evidence that must
be collected for being able to issue a certificate;
5. validity tests regarding the configuration of the cloud provider and the CUMULUS
framework itself that should be satisfied before issuing certificates;
6. the monitoring configurations that will be used in order to collect the evidence
required for generating certificates;
7. the way in which the collected evidence will be aggregated in certificates (evidence
aggregation); and
8. a life cycle model that defines the overall process of issuing certificates.
The assessment scheme in an MBCM (see Figure 4) defines general conditions regard-
ing the evidence that must be collected in order to be able to issue and maintain a
certificate according to the particular MBCM. These conditions are related to:
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i. the sufficiency of the collected evidence collection (e.g., minimum period over
which a target of certification must be monitored before a certificate for the particu-
lar property of it can be issued) and are specified by evidence sufficiency condition
elements,
ii. the absence of conflicting evidence regarding the property to be certified, i.e., evi-
dence that the security property of interest would have been violated if the assess-
ment were to be made over a different time period (specified as conflict elements),
and
iii. the absence of any anomalies, i.e., indications of potential attacks or operating con-
ditions which despite of not having affected yet the security property that is as-
sessed, may do so in the future (specified by anomalies elements).
These conditions must be satisfied, in addition to the guarantee states that are part of
the assertion definition of the property, for the certificate to be issued. 2
Fig. 4.MBCM Assessment Scheme
Once it receives an MBCM, the monitoring manager checks whether the security
property that is to be certified can be monitored for the given TOC. This is performed
by parsing the property, creating an abstract syntax tree (AST) for it and using AST
to establish whether the TOC is placed on a cloud infrastructure that can provide the
raw monitoring events required in order to check the security property. This check is
performed by checking the monitoring capabilities of the cloud where TOC is placed
[11,6]. If this check is successful, the monitoring manager creates a concrete monitor-
ing configuration as part of the MBCM, i.e., a description of the event captors and the
monitor that will be used to monitor the property and the subscriptions that will be re-
quired in order to enable the communication of events from the former to the latter. The
transmission of events from event captors to the monitor of the CUMULUS framework
takes place through an event bus (events are encrypted). Depending on the validity tests
specified in MBCM, the monitoring manager may also require that the event captors
and the event bus used for the capture and transmission of monitoring events run also
2 A full description of the schema for specifying MBCMs is available in [5].
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on infrastructures that are enabled by a trusted platform module (TPM) and that their
implementations at the outset have integrity. Subsequently, the monitoring manager ini-
tiates the monitoring process by: (a) activating the event captors, and (b) translating the
security property that is to be certified into monitorable assertions and passing them to
the monitor to start the runtime checking. Following the above, steps the monitoring
manager polls the monitor at regular intervals to collect any monitoring results, which
are relevant to the security property that is being assessed. These results are stored in
the evidence DB of the framework.
When the collected evidence is sufficient for making an assessment about the prop-
erty, i.e., it satisfies the evidence sufficiency conditions of the MBCM, two further
checks are performed to establish if a certificate can be issued for the TOC:
1. A check of whether the collected evidence shows any violations of the monitored
security property;
2. A check of whether any additional validity conditions specified in the MBCM are
satisfied. Such conditions may, for example, require a TPM-enabled confirmation
of the integrity of the components used to collect and analyse the monitoring evi-
dence, as well as the components of the CUMULUS framework itself throughout
the monitoring process.
3. A check of whether any detected anomalies and conflicts are acceptable to the cer-
tification authority that will sign of the certificate.
These checks are performed by the certificate generator and if 1 and 2 are successful,
the generator aggregates the accumulated monitoring evidence and creates a certificate
of the security property for the TOC incorporating the aggregated evidence with it. The
aggregation of monitoring evidence takes place as described by the evidence aggrega-
tion element of MBCM. Once generated, a certificate is stored in the certificates DB
and can be retrieved by any external party that has (read) access rights to it. The re-
trieval of certificates is supported by the certification communicator component of the
CUMULUS framework.
In the current implementation, we are using EVEREST (EVEnt REaSoning Toolkit
[7]) as a key component of the certificate generator to perform the monitoring required
during the certification process. EVEREST is an open-source monitoring framework
developed by the authors of this paper that are working for City University to support the
monitoring of service-based systems. EVEREST supports the monitoring of properties
expressed in a first order temporal logic language based on Event Calculus.
5 An example: Certificate issuing in an e-Health scenario
An example of security property that could be certified through a monitoring based cer-
tificate in the e-Health scenario is an instance of an integrity requiring that a TOC should
protect that data that it stores from unauthorized alterations. This property corresponds
to AIS:integrity:data-alteration-prevention in the catalogue of properties that
the Cloud Security Alliance has defined [3]. In the CUMULUS framework this prop-
erty is specified as an assertion in SecureSLA* as shown in Figure 5. The description
of SecureSLA* is beyond the scope of this paper and can be found in [3]. The above
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definition of the integrity property uses the variable autop which indicates an invoca-
tion of the authorisation operation of authorisation::interface::authorise to
check if cns has appropriate authorisation rights (successful authorization is indicated
by requiring the output result of the authorization operation to be true). The property
of protected (i.e., authorised) alteration is then specified by a guarantee state which re-
quires that for each invocation of a data alteration operation, the authorization operation
has been invoked prior to it and it has responded with an output that indicates the au-
thorization of the particular consumer. The temporal sequence of the two operations is
indicated by the condition less_than (request (autop), request (altop)) and less_than (re-
ply(autop), request(altop)). The correlation of the requester of the alteration operation
and the agent whose credentials are checked by the authorisation operation is ensured
by using the same value for the requester parameter of the data alteration operation and
the agent parameter of the authorisation operation (i.e., credentials). In the case of the
above property the CUMULUS framework would first check if the cloud infrastructure
where the specific TOC whose integrity is to be certified can provide primitive events
capturing the calls of the operations dataalteration::interface::deletepatient
and authorisation::interface::authorize and the responses to these calls,
i.e., events matching the terms request(autop), request(altop), reply(autop), and re-
quest(altop) in the above assertion. If such event captors exist the monitoring pro-
cess can start. The evidence sufficiency conditions in this case could, for exam-
ple, require that the considered event log should include at least 10,000 invoca-
tions of each of the operations dataalteration::interface::deletepatient and
authorisation::interface::authorize, gathered over a period of at least 1 year.
Based on these conditions, if after collecting evidence satisfying the above conditions,
there are no instances of violation of the assertion in Figure 5, a certificate for the rele-
vant TOC and the property can be generated.
6 Future Work
In this section we report on a preliminary suitability desktop analysis of the state of the
art Cloud monitoring tools to address security properties. Namely, we have performed
an initial prospective analysis regarding which of these off-the-shelf monitoring tools
seem to support evidence gathering in order to validate that any of the properties in
the catalog defined in [3] are present. In [3] the interested reader can find more details
about property definition. For our analysis, we have inspected the metrics that these
monitoring tools could collect and judged whether their reported values could be used
as evidence for the security properties in [3]. The result of this analysis is summarized
in Table 1. Notice that we omit completely in the discussion those categories from
[3] that do not seem to be supported by any monitoring tool. This result will be our
starting point for a hands-on evaluation of some of these Cloud monitoring tools both
regarding evidence gathering and how difficult or easy it is to use them as external
monitoring tools that can gather evidence for our infrastructure in order to issue or
maintain certificates.
Next, we will name the category, the number of its properties breakdown between
parenthesis, and which monitoring tools seem able to gather evidences at any of the
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assertion {
sla_ template { . . .
altop is invocation [ invoke {
endpoint = enpoint::id::a
operation = dataalteration::interface::deletepatient
param { name = requester value = credentials } } ]
autop is invocation [ invoke {
endpoint = endpoint::id::b
operation = authorisation::interface::authorise
param { name = agent value = credentials }
param { name = result value = true } } ]
/* —AGREEMENT TERM—- */
agreement_ term { id = agreement::term::1 guaranteedstate
{ id = guaranteedstate1
( less_ than (request(autop),(request(altop)) ) and
(less_ than (reply(autop),request(altop)) ) } }
}
}
Fig. 5. Assertion for data alteration prevention
cloud levels in relation to one property in that category. In short, based on the number of
security properties covered, Nagios, Hyperic and New Relic are those tools that are able
to gather evidences that could help CUMULUS to certify a major number of security
properties. For these tools, we will perform a hands on analysis in the immediate future.
This analysis will also consider how easy or hard is to achieve a proper interplay of these
tools with the CUMULUS monitoring infrastructure.
We explain next what is shown briefly in Table 1. This table shows which moni-
toring tools seem to support which security properties from [3, Annex A] according to
their provided descriptions:
– A.1.AIS: Application & Interface Security (18). OSSEC seems suitable to check
both A.1.2 Software alteration detection and A.1.4 Data alteration
detection. Nagios, Hyperic and New Relic could help to validate the property
A.1.9 network authenticated server access. Also, New Relic could help
to validate the property A.1.17 user traceability.
– A.2 IVS: Infrastructure & Virtualization Security (2). Nagios seems useful to vali-
date A.2.1 Tenant isolation level.
– A.4 SEF: Security Incident Management, E-Discovery & Cloud Forensics (3). Na-
gios, Hyperic, New Relic and OSSEC seem to offer support for validating the prop-
erties in this category.
– A14. Business Continuity Management & Operational Resilience (11). Nagios, Hy-
peric and New Relic seem suitable to address this category.
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A.14 (11) X X X
A.15 (4)
A.15.3 X X X X X
A.15.4 X X X X X
Table 1. Security properties coverage by SotA Cloud monitoring tools (Desktop analysis)
– A9. Legal & Standards Compliance (5). New Relic seems suitable to address in
particular, the property A.9.1 Country level anchoring.
– A.11 DSI (Data Security & Information Life cycle Management) (7). New Relic
seems suitable to address the property A.11.6 Storage retrievability. Also,
OSSEC seems suitable for A.11.3 Data leakage detection.
– A15. Change Control & Configuration Management (4). Zenos, Hyperic, Nagios,
New Relic, and Ganglia seem specifically adequate to validate some properties
in this category. In particular, the properties A.15.3 Percentage of timely
configuration change notifications and A.15.4 Configuration change
reporting capability.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a certification infrastructure that is able to manage
monitoring based certification, testing based certification and, in an immediate future, as
we explain below, also TPM based and hybrid certification (to combine both monitoring
and testing approaches). We have focused on the monitoring based certification and
have illustrated our approach to address it with an example from the e-Health domain.
The insfrastructure described in this paper is intended to offer support for a (constant)
evaluation of an IT resource in order to determine whether certain security property
hold from a given point in time on, in a particular context. In this manner we try to
reinforce transparency in the industry, helping business to evaluate the security risks
they may accept when working with a particular cloud service provider.
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We have also reported on off-the-shelf tools for cloud infrastructure monitoring, and
have identified a number of open source versions of industrial strength tools that could
be used by the CUMULUS infrastructure as external evidence collectors. Finally, we
have reported on the results of a preliminary suitability desktop analysis to address the
catalog of the security properties in [3]. This analysis was based on the inspection of the
metrics collected by these tools, and their potential use as evidences supporting these
security properties.
We conclude noting that, in addition to the infrastructure described in section 3,
there are some components that are not currently part of the framework but are planned
to be implemented in the future. For example, an Auditing Module will allow cloud
auditors to analyze the entire certification process, including the certifications mod-
els, the processed evidences and the issued certificates. Also, a Trusted Computing
manager component will be integrated to provide authentication and measurement
functions based on the Trusted Computing platform for both the Monitoring and Test-
ing Monitor Managers. Finally, an Hybrid Manager component will be designed and
implemented so as it can be responsible to handle hybrid certificates (e.g., certificates
based upon both types of evidences gathered by monitoring and testing or TC) when
the Certification Manager calls it through the ‘Hybrid Manager API.’ It should probably
communicate with the other managers, in order to collect all required information for
hybrid certification.
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